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Foreword

The Future of the Supreme Court:
Institutional Reform and Beyond
David R. Stras† and Karla Vehrs∗
The Supreme Court of the United States is facing a potentially defining moment in its history. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. has
replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor to become the 110th
Justice of the Supreme Court. The Senate’s confirmation of
Judge Alito may shift the ideological balance of the Supreme
Court to the right, potentially fulfilling President George W.
Bush’s campaign pledge to nominate Justices in the mold of
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.1
Perhaps more importantly, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist passed away on September 3, 2005, after battling
thyroid cancer for several months. In his place, President Bush
nominated District of Columbia Circuit Judge John G. Roberts
to become the seventeenth Chief Justice of the United States.
Following the first confirmation hearing in this country in over

† Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank my
coauthor and the other editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their
superb planning of this symposium.
∗ Symposium Articles Editor, Minnesota Law Review, Volume 90. Special thanks to my coauthor for his tremendous help in planning this symposium, and to the University of Minnesota Law School, Dean Alex Johnson, Associate Deans Jim Chen and Mike Paulsen, and Professor Dale Carpenter for
their valuable support. I thank the board and staff of the Minnesota Law Review, especially Editor-in-Chief Matt Krueger, for all the thought, time, and
dedication they put into this finished product. Finally, a special thanks to the
law firm of Lindquist & Vennum P.L.L.P. for its kind sponsorship of this symposium.
1. Prior to nominating Judge Alito, President Bush nominated his White
House Counsel, Harriet Miers, to fill Justice O’Connor’s seat, but Ms. Miers
ultimately withdrew, in part because the popular press and blogosphere relentlessly attacked her ostensible lack of qualifications to sit on the Supreme
Court. See Robin Toner, et al., Steady Erosion in Support Undercut Nomination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A16.
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eleven years, Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed by the Senate by a vote of 78–22.
When we began planning this symposium in February
2005, we never could have envisioned the tumultuous months
that followed. Regardless, the replacement of perhaps the two
most significant legal figures of the past twenty years provides
a unique opportunity to consider the future of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Our paramount goal in planning this symposium was to
bring together a talented group of scholars to consider the institutional characteristics of the Supreme Court. The legal literature is replete with articles considering the legal and policy implications of Supreme Court decisions, but contains
comparatively few analyzing the Court as an institution.2 As
time passed and the event loomed closer, it became increasingly
clear that another goal of the symposium would be to offer suggestions to the new Roberts Court and Congress on the function
and direction of the Supreme Court. With these goals in mind,
thirteen leading scholars accepted our invitation to participate
in this symposium.
We divided the participants into four panels, with Professor Adrian Vermeule presenting an introductory lecture on the
feasibility of Supreme Court reform. The symposium’s first
panel, consisting of Professors Michael Gerhardt, Daniel Farber, and Randy Barnett, addressed the role of precedent at the
Supreme Court. The panel discussed at length the controversial
issue of whether “super precedent” exists. The timeliness of the
exchange was revealed when it was made the subject of an article by law professor Jeffrey Rosen in the New York Times a
week after the symposium.3 The second panel, including Professors Thomas Lee, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, and Mark
Tushnet, examined the role of external influences on the decision making of the Justices, considering, among other issues,

2. Political scientists have done a far better job at analyzing the institutional characteristics of the Supreme Court, as demonstrated by some recent
books on the subject. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (2005); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman
eds., 1999). However, much of this research is descriptive institutional analysis and accordingly fails to make normative suggestions about the Supreme
Court as an institution.
3. See Jeffrey Rosen, So, Do You Believe in ‘Superprecedent’?, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, § 4, at 1.
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individual backgrounds, cultural norms, and foreign laws. The
third group of panelists, consisting of Professors Stephen
Smith, Martin Redish, and Neal Devins, addressed the apparent tension between the intensely political controversies the
Supreme Court decides and its role as a neutral arbiter of legal
disputes. Finally, the fourth panel, consisting of Professors
David Stras and Steven Calabresi, and Dean Kenneth Starr,
assessed the implications of the Supreme Court’s shrinking
docket and workload.
The following pages contain Essays resulting from the
symposium. In his introductory Essay, Professor Vermeule discusses the difficulties inherent in achieving institutional reform
of the Supreme Court. He posits that political factors frequently give rise to a reform versus counter-reform equilibrium, where strong movements in favor of reform create
equally strong obstacles to reform, most often rendering substantive reform unlikely. The challenges to Supreme Court reform include the failure of traditional political alliances; the
difficulty in achieving an optimal majority; the delicate balance
necessary for leaders to advocate for reform yet not act merely
in self-interest; and the need for political crises, which can
serve as both the engine and the brakes for reform proposals.
Professor Vermeule concludes that the interests of the Supreme
Court are best served when those with expertise in a particular
field put forth what are, in their best judgment, optimal proposals for reform, leaving the political wrangling to those actors
involved in the political process.
Professor Gerhardt examines the concept of “super precedent” raised during the recent confirmation hearings of Chief
Justice Roberts.4 He identifies three different areas where the
term might be applied: fundamental institutional practices of
the Court, foundational doctrines for approaching constitutional interpretation, and individual Supreme Court holdings
that are repeatedly affirmed by the Court, accepted by other
branches, and relied upon by the public. Professor Gerhardt
concludes that the introduction of the term “super precedent”
into the legal vocabulary may significantly impact the future of
the Supreme Court, including the way in which confirmation

4. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing on S. 109–158 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–4 (2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter,
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary).
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hearings are conducted and the way judges and scholars analyze the Court’s precedents.5
Professor Farber examines the tension between stare decisis and originalism. In response to originalism, he points out
that a complete rejection of stare decisis is impracticable because of evolving views of history, methodological differences in
judging, and the difficulty of assigning a static meaning to the
broad terms in the Constitution. Professor Farber concludes
that constitutional stare decisis, much like the Constitution itself, is worthwhile because it is adaptable and accommodating;
constitutional precedent does not result in bright-line rules, but
instead in functional guidelines that allow for the evolution of
constitutional doctrine.
In addition to having the most colorful title in the symposium, “It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt,” Professor Barnett takes issue
with those who would argue that super precedents ought to be
immune from reversal. He points out that, at the time they
were decided, cases such as Dred Scott and Plessy would have
been considered super precedents, but that this ultimately had
no bearing on whether they were decided correctly under an
originalist view of the Constitution. The benefit of hindsight
tells us that reliance on the Constitution to support these decisions was misplaced and that, despite sociological motivations
to the contrary, the Court ought to have reversed them sooner.
He concludes that historical and sociological factors provide the
true inertia behind super precedents and that constitutional
stare decisis upholding “super precedents” might well be superfluous.
Professor Onwuachi-Willig proposes an increase in the
number of Justices on the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen
to facilitate greater diversity on the Supreme Court. Her view
is premised on the argument that the background of Justices,
including their race, sex, class, and religion, to name just a few,
has a profound impact on their approaches to judicial decisionmaking. Professor Onwuachi-Willig argues that the goal of
greater representation for minority voices can be effectively
achieved through an increase in the number of seats available
on the Supreme Court.

5. Judge J. Michael Luttig first raised the issue of “super stare decisis”
with respect to abortion in Richmond Medical Center for Women v. Gilmore,
219 F.3d 376, 376 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Professor Tushnet addresses some of the criticisms leveled
against federal judges for citing foreign and international
sources of law. He categorizes these criticisms into a few main
concerns: that foreign law is given too much weight by American judges; that citations to foreign law are irrelevant to
judges’ holdings and thus superfluous; that foreign laws do not
embody the same legal norms that American laws do; and that
American judges are insufficiently informed about foreign laws
to wield such a tool skillfully. Professor Tushnet concludes that
all but a small number of these criticisms are unfair because
many of the same criticisms can be directed towards other
sources of law that judges examine and rely upon in order to
decide the cases before them.
Professor Devins argues that today’s Supreme Court
should not worry about upsetting political actors with its decisions. Unlike the Warren Court era, for example, today’s legislators are more focused on appeasing their constituents, parties, and special-interest groups than on pushing for true
change of the Supreme Court. He argues that Court-curbing
proposals are much less likely to succeed today than in the past
because legislators lack genuine interest in real reform. Because the Court and Congress are often in lockstep with respect
to their political views, the Court can be reasonably certain
that few institution-altering proposals will actually be enacted
into law.
Professor Redish and his coauthor, Uma Amuluru, address
the constitutionality of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which
established the Supreme Court’s role in promulgating and
amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Over time, they
argue, experience has demonstrated that it is often impossible
to separate substantive issues from the procedural ones in matters of civil adjudication, and that procedural rules can undermine the policy judgments of Congress. Consequently, Redish
and Amuluru conclude that the Rules Enabling Act may well
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking authority to the Supreme Court.
Professor Stras examines the role of economic incentives in
inducing the timely retirement of Supreme Court Justices. He
constructs an economic model that includes the relevant variables, such as workload, income, and prestige, which have the
most impact on the retirement decisions of Justices. Such a
model, he argues, can help us better understand the decision
making of Justices in purely personal areas. He concludes that,
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based on the incentives approach to retirement, Congress
should focus its attention on making incremental institutional
modifications, such as to pensions and workload, rather than
enacting command-and-control measures such as term limits or
a mandatory retirement age for Justices.
Professor Calabresi and his coauthor, David Presser, propose that Congress reinstitute the practice of “circuit riding,”
the long-abandoned requirement that Justices spend a certain
amount of time each year in their assigned judicial circuits
hearing lower court cases. Specifically, their proposal would require Justices to spend four weeks in July serving as district
court judges and presiding over trials. Calabresi and Presser
conclude that circuit riding would serve several important institutional interests, including reacquainting Justices with
American culture outside of Washington; inducing earlier retirements; and preventing the undue influence of foreign law on
Supreme Court decisions, which they contend is stimulated by
Justices spending their summer recesses abroad.
Dean Starr examines the impact that William Howard
Taft, the former President turned Chief Justice, had on the Supreme Court. Taft shepherded through Congress what became
the Judiciary Act of 1925, which established discretionary certiorari jurisdiction for the Court. Starr believes that the
Rehnquist Court’s reliance on certiorari jurisdiction to reduce
the number of cases on the Court’s merits docket has been an
unfortunate development. In failing to use the certiorari tool
cautiously as Taft intended, the Court has often neglected important, unresolved questions of federal law and vexing circuit
splits.
The transformational change the Court is undergoing is
certain to accelerate over the next decade as additional Justices
retire.6 This transformation provides an occasion to challenge
some of our fundamental assumptions about the Supreme
Court and to provide normative recommendations about its future. It is our belief that one of the most fertile and under6. Now that Judge Alito has been confirmed, six of the nine Justices are
older than 65. By the time this symposium issue is printed, three Justices—
John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg—will be more
than 70 years old. One other Justice—Anthony Kennedy—will turn 70 this
summer. By historical standards, this is a very elderly Supreme Court, and we
can anticipate more retirements over the next several years. See Oyez, U.S.
Supreme Court Justices: A Listing of all Supreme Court Justices, http://www
.oyez.org/oyez/portlet/justices/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (follow the Justices’
names hyperlinks to find brief biographies of each Justice).
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explored areas of legal scholarship is the analysis and evaluation of the institutional characteristics of the Supreme Court. It
is our hope that this symposium is a significant step in advancing that discussion.

